首页 > Uncategorized > New York Times:In Graft Inquiry, Chinese See a Shake-Up Coming

New York Times:In Graft Inquiry, Chinese See a Shake-Up Coming

2006年10月4日

BEIJING, Oct. 3 — When Shanghai’s party boss was detained in an
anticorruption probe last week, Chinese were rattled by news of the
first purge of a high-ranking Communist Party leader since 1995. But
the investigation’s scope and its ultimate goals are wider, as the
party’s two most powerful officials aim to shake up the leadership and
wipe out resistance to their policy agenda, party officials and
analysts say.

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Ng Han Guan/Associated Press

Zeng Qinghong, right, China’s reputed political mastermind, with
President Hu Jintao, left, and Premier Wen Jiabao at a meeting in
March.

The investigation, the largest of its kind since China
first pursued market-style changes to its economy more than a
quarter-century ago, was planned and supervised by Zeng Qinghong,
China’s vice president and the day-to-day manager of Communist Party
affairs, people informed about the operation said.

They said Mr.
Zeng had used the investigation to force provincial leaders to heed
Beijing’s economic directives, sideline officials loyal to the former
top leader, Jiang Zemin, and strengthen Mr. Zeng’s own hand as well as that of his current master, President Hu Jintao.

Aside
from frightening officials who have grown accustomed to increasingly
conspicuous corruption in recent years, the crackdown could give Mr. Hu
greater leeway to carry out his agenda for broader welfare benefits and
stronger pollution controls, which may prove popular in China today.

Some
critics fear that it may also consolidate greater power in the hands of
a leader who has consistently sought to restrict the news media, censor
the Web and punish peaceful political dissent.

The high-level
purge began on Sept. 25, when Chen Liangyu, the Shanghai party leader
and a Politburo member, was removed from his office on corruption
charges. Party security forces had already detained high-ranking
officials in Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Fujian and Hunan. Mr. Chen is
the most powerful person removed from office since 1995, when the
Beijing party leader was purged, also on corruption charges, during a
power struggle.

Several party officials and well-informed
political observers said they believed that the investigation had not
yet reached its climax. They say Mr. Zeng hopes to dismiss two fellow
members of the Politburo Standing Committee, Jia Qinglin and Huang Ju,
who are under pressure to take “political responsibility” for
corruption that has occurred in Beijing and Shanghai, their respective
areas of influence.

If he succeeds in removing officials who
serve on the nine-member Standing Committee, the party’s top
leadership, the purge will amount to the biggest political shake-up
since 1989, when Deng Xiaoping ousted Zhao Ziyang, then the party’s general secretary, after the crackdown on democracy protests in Beijing.

It
would also be likely to seal Mr. Zeng’s reputation as China’s political
mastermind, who mixes personal ambition with a nearly legendary ability
to deliver results for his superiors. Officially ranked No. 5 in the
party hierarchy, he is widely seen as exercising more authority within
the party than anyone except Mr. Hu.

Chinese politicking takes
place under a heavy veil of secrecy, and speculation about what happens
in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound, has been intense since
Mr. Chen’s detention last week.

It is rarely possible to get
authoritative confirmation of political maneuvers in China. The people
who discussed the situation with a foreign reporter did so on condition
of anonymity, citing fears of retribution.

The course of the
anticorruption campaign may shift if central leaders face a strong
backlash at the party’s annual Central Committee meeting, which will be
held Oct. 8-11. One well-placed political observer said he doubted that
Mr. Huang or Mr. Jia would be forced from office before their expected
retirement next year.

Even so, the weakened position of the two
men and their patron, Mr. Jiang, whom Mr. Hu and Mr. Zeng pushed from
his last post in 2004, could have a significant impact on Chinese
policy and leadership decisions.

Mr. Jiang’s old loyalists, often
referred to as the Shanghai faction, tended to favor fast economic
growth, a relatively high degree of provincial autonomy in economic
affairs, loose controls on investment and bank lending and close ties
between the party and the country’s rising class of private businessmen.

Mr.
Hu, 63, and Mr. Zeng, 67, have at least for now forged an alliance that
dominates party leadership, party officials say. They advocate slower
and more stable growth, greater attention to social inequality and
pollution, and an expansion of state support for education, medical
care and social security.

Most of the officials singled out so
far in the anticorruption sweep are seen as closer to Mr. Jiang and as
having ignored central directives to tamp down state-led investment.
That, party officials say, shows that the continuing legal
investigation serves as a cover for a political campaign to change the
party’s policy direction.

Mr. Zeng plans to use the Central
Committee meeting to elevate Mr. Hu’s political slogan, “harmonious
society,” into an official “theory.”

The catch phrase covers a range of policies intended to restore a
balance between the country’s thriving market economy and its neglected
socialist ideology, primarily by paying greater attention to peasants
and migrant workers who have benefited much less than the white-collar
elite in China’s long economic boom.

At the meeting,
party leaders will discuss “the theory of building a harmonious
socialist society,” party officials said. In effect, Mr. Zeng is
promoting Mr. Hu’s concept into doctrine, to be taught alongside the
theories of Mao, Deng and Mr. Jiang.

People informed about Mr.
Zeng’s planning described that step and others as part of a carefully
calculated series of political moves that began last spring.

They
said Mr. Zeng had instructed the inspectors responsible for enforcing
party discipline to investigate activities in the political strongholds
of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, where he suspected that senior party
officials were allowing rampant profiteering by relatives and friends,
and where the leaders owed their positions mainly to Mr. Jiang.

Those urban enclaves, whose leaders enjoy considerable autonomy, had also defied repeated efforts by Mr. Hu and Wen Jiabao, the prime minister, to rein in bank lending in overheated sectors like real estate.

Anticipating
that Mr. Jiang might seek to protect his allies, Mr. Zeng first moved
to mollify him by rolling out a tribute: the publication of his
collected works. Party units nationwide were instructed to purchase and
study the three-volume collection of speeches and essays, a financial
and political windfall.

The crackdown initially focused on
lower-level officials in the big cities. When investigators gathered
evidence to implicate Mr. Chen, the Shanghai party boss, Mr. Zeng
summoned him to Beijing, presented him with the pending indictment and
pressed him to resign, these people said. He was said to have refused.

Faced
with the prospect of a hostile purge, the first of its kind affecting a
Politburo member since 1995, Mr. Zeng and Mr. Hu sent Mr. Chen’s file
to Mr. Jiang, asking for his advice, a person close to Mr. Zeng’s
office said.

Confronted with evidence of high-level corruption in Shanghai, Mr. Jiang approved removing Mr. Chen, the people said.

Armed
with that victory, Mr. Zeng has pushed to create a new standard of
“political responsibility,” modeled after a code seen by him to prevail
in American politics, which holds senior leaders responsible if their
underlings disgrace the party, people informed about his thinking said.

That
new standard could be used against Mr. Huang, a former Shanghai party
boss and a Jiang loyalist, and Mr. Jia, who supervised Beijing.

“The
old standard for senior party members was legal guilt,” said one person
who spoke about Mr. Zeng’s thinking. “Under the new standard you could
lose your post for mismanagement even if they can’t prove you put one
cent in your own pocket.”

Others raised doubts that the purge
would reach people that high up the hierarchy. The ruling party risks
undermining its own authority if it acknowledges that corruption
extends into the most elite ruling circle, they said.

More generally, Mr. Zeng’s prominent role has raised questions about his influence relative to Mr. Hu’s, party officials said.

Mr.
Hu holds the posts of party general secretary, head of the military and
president of China, the country’s three most important. Mr. Zeng,
though he runs the party’s main coordinating office, is outranked in
its official hierarchy not only by Mr. Hu but also by three other
Standing Committee members.

Moreover, until Mr. Hu and Mr. Zeng
unexpectedly joined forces in 2004 to push Mr. Jiang into full
retirement, Mr. Zeng was seen as close to Mr. Jiang. The two worked
side by side since they served in Shanghai together in the 1980’s.

But Mr. Zeng’s campaign to remove some Jiang loyalists may end up
strengthening his own hand as well as Mr. Hu’s, some party officials
suggested. The reason is that Mr. Zeng has become the standard-bearer
for a wide array of political interests.

The son of one of
Mao’s first security chiefs, Mr. Zeng maintains close ties to the sons
and daughters of Communist China’s founding fathers and has relatives
in the military. He has supporters among those who favor deeper
capitalist-style changes to the economy and financial system.

Some
Chinese intellectuals say he has signaled an openness to political
change. Mr. Hu, in contrast, is viewed as cautious and doctrinaire.

Mr.
Hu has sought to promote officials he trusts from his days as a
provincial official in western China and as the head of the national
Communist Youth League in the 1980’s. Though he now has broad
authority, his traditional base is considered narrower and less
influential than that of Mr. Zeng.

The political dance between
the men underlines uncertainties about the political succession
scheduled to take place in 2007. At that time the party will hold a
congress, as it does every five years, to approve a new lineup of
officials for the Politburo as well as other top party, government and
provincial positions.

Party officials say that while Mr. Hu and
Mr. Zeng have worked together to consolidate their own power, they have
not agreed on choices for the Standing Committee or some top provincial
posts. That suggests that their alliance possibly temporary and that
the country’s politics could remain volatile.

“I think that at
this point neither of them has the power to dictate the future,” one
party official said. “They need each other, but that does not mean they
trust each other.”

译文

纽约时报4日披露北京领导层次结构整肃上海帮的内幕。报道说,这波针对遭撤职的
前上海市委书记陈良宇展开的调查,是由中国国家副主席曾庆红所规划及监督,目标
是利用打击贪渎,趁势扫除抗拒中央经济方针的省级领导,边缘化前国家主席江泽民
的人马,并巩固他自己与国家主席胡锦涛的势力。

报道说,除了藉杀鸡儆猴来威吓地方贪渎的官员之外,这次整肃行动也让胡锦涛得以
实施他所主张的福利政策与污染管制,在今日中国,这是深得民心的政策。

这波整肃起於9月25日中央政治局委员、上海市委书记陈良宇遭撤职。接着,上海、
北京、天津、福建与湖南多名高阶官员相继遭到逮捕。由於陈良宇是自1995年以来遭
整肃的最高阶官员,因此最引人瞩目。

多名中共官员与关系良好的政治观察家说,他们相信这波调查行动还没达到高峰。他
们说,曾庆红希望让贾庆林与黄菊退出9人组成的中央政治局常务委员会,而这两人
当前分别因为北京与上海的贪渎案件而承受负起政治责任的压力。

如果贾庆林与黄菊真的被逼退,这将是自1989年天安门民主运动爆发、邓小平撤换党
总书记赵紫阳以来,中共领导层次结构最大规模的政治变动,而曾庆红的权力也更形
获得巩固。曾庆红在党内层级虽只排名第5,但在掌控与运用权力上,当前已经是胡
锦涛之下,万人之上的第2号人物。

自从陈良宇中箭落马後,外界对於中南海神秘的权力斗争有着种种揣测,但各种说法
都不可能得到当局的证实。向纽约时报透露这些消息的人士都请求匿名,以免遭到报
复。

报道说,这波反贪污运动如果在8日到11日所举行的中共16届6中全会上遭到强烈反击
,可能会迫使中央改弦易辙。一位政治观察家透露,他认为黄菊或贾庆林绝不会坐以
待毙,让自己在明年退休前被提前赶出政治局常务委员会这个决策机构。黄菊与贾庆
林向来被归类为江泽民人马。

江泽民的上海帮向来主张快速发展经济,给于省在经济事务上高度的自主权,对投资
与银行放款管制宽松,并和中国新兴的富人阶级创建起密切关系。

63岁的胡锦涛与67岁的曾庆红现在至少形成结盟态势,主导了党内的领导权。他们提
倡放慢经济发展,追求稳健成长,把更多的注意力放在导正社会不平等、控制环境污
染,以及扩大国民教育、医疗照护与社会安全之上。

大多数遭到反贪污行动波及的官员都是与江泽民有密切关系者,过去对中央请求减少
国家投资的命令充耳不闻。根据中共官员透露,这显示当前持续进行的调查行动其实
是个政治掩护,让胡锦涛得以改变党的政策方向。

曾庆红计划利用16届6中全会来把胡锦涛提倡的「和谐社会」变成党的理论。所谓的
和谐社会涵盖诸多政策,但其目的就是要在蓬勃茁壮的市场经济与遭到忽视的社会主
义意识形态之间求取平衡,而要照顾的焦点就是没有从经济发展获得多少好处的农民
与离乡背井到外地谋生的民工。

中共官员说,在会议上党的领袖们将讨论「创建和谐社会主义社会的理论」,事实上
,曾庆红希望把胡锦涛的和谐社会主张变成主义,与毛、邓、江的理论一并教授。

根据熟知曾庆红规划的人士透露,这些精心计划的政治行动,是从今年春天开始展开
。他们说,当时曾庆红指示共党纪律委员会调查在北京、上海与天津的高阶共党官员
,因为他怀疑这些地方的官员放纵亲属朋友牟利。而这叁地的干部能爬到高位,都是
江泽民的提拔。此外,这些都会地区的高干由於享有相当程度的自治权,对中央抑制
银行放款与过热的房地产市场的命令阳奉阴违。

由於预期到江泽民可能会保护自己人马,曾庆红第一步先是吹捧江泽民,出版他的文
选,并下令全党各单位采购研读。接着,一开始的整肃目标仅是大城市的低级官员,
当调查人员搜集到足够的证据来指控陈良宇时,曾庆红把陈良宇叫到北京,让他亲眼
看看证据和将受到控告的罪名,请求他自己辞职。但据说陈良宇拒绝辞职。

据亲近曾庆红办公室的一名官员透露,由於陈良宇具有政治局委员身份,一旦撤职兹
事体大;曾庆红和胡锦涛於是把陈良宇涉案的档案送给江泽民过目,并谘询他的意见

面对证据与上海的贪污盛行,江泽民终於批准查办陈良宇。

在这场胜利後,曾庆红接着设置出「政治责任」的新标准,据说这标准是他参照美国
政治的标准而定,明白请求凡属下涉案者,其上级长官将负起连带责任。因此,此一
标准便可以用来对付黄菊和贾庆林;原因是黄菊是前上海市委书记,而贾庆林则负责
督导北京。

一名人士向纽约时报表示,过去的旧标准就是法律判决,但在新标准之下,如果你管
理不当,即使他们找不出证据证明你把钱放进自己口袋,还是可能会丢官。

但对於这波整肃行动层级是否会直达如黄、贾的最顶层,不少人存有疑问。因为如果
中共承认贪污以腐化了党的最高领导层次结构,将会削弱自己的权威。

此外,胡锦涛与曾庆红之间的权力关系也耐人寻味。外界原本视曾庆红为江泽民人马
,但他却在2004年与胡锦涛联手,逼迫江泽民全退。曾庆红铲除江系的举动,巩固了
自己与胡锦涛的权位。而曾庆红拜出身之赐,与许多中共建政元老的子女关系良好,
也有亲戚任职解放军。他的支持者中,包括主张在经济与金融制度上推动资本主义方
式改革者。

一些中国知识分子说,曾庆红曾暗示他对政治改革持开放态度;相较之下,胡锦涛则
审慎且教条。

获胡锦涛拔擢者,大多是他自己在西部与共青团任职期间培养出来的人马,虽然胡锦
涛如今具有无上权威,但是他的常规基础与曾庆红相较之下,就显得窄小也较不具影
响力。

据共党官员透露,胡、曾二人尚未对政治局常委与一些高阶省籍干部人选达成一致意
见,这显示两人的结盟可能只是短暂性的,也让未来中国的政治充满高度不确定性。
一位中共官员说,此刻他们两人都无法主导未来,「两人现在是彼此需要,但不代表
他们互相信任」。

分类:Uncategorized
  1. Xie
    2006年10月26日 10:04 上午

    这是一块 荒无人烟 的地方  ~~

  2. Anonymous
    2007年01月7日 6:29 上午

    啧啧啧~~像极了一出辫子戏

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